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ABSTRACT 
This paper gives a brief overview of subsidy arrangements in the privatised passenger 
rail industry in Britain before focusing on productivity performance across the first 
four years under the new privatised structure.  Subsidy reductions are analysed in 
terms of the average annual percentage increases required in passenger revenues to 
offset these reductions for each train operating company.  These are found to range 
from 2% to 21%.  It is highlighted however that such 'gains' could equally be 
achieved through cutting costs, hence subsidy cuts are also specified in relation to cost 
reductions and found to range from 1% to 10%.  Productivity is then examined 
through the use of a Translog productivity index, with passenger train kilometres 
specified as the output, and labour, traction rolling stock and infrastructure specified 
as the inputs. 
For the network as a whole, it is found that total productivity has risen on average by 
4% p.a. over the initial privatisation period.  Most of these gains have been achieved 
through labour reductions and increases in output resulting from improved utilisation 
of existing inputs.  Comparisons are then made with the performance of the 
nationalised British Rail over a number of time periods.  The overriding conclusion is 
that gains made in the early period of private sector management, although appearing 
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to be of a sufficient size to offset subsidy reductions, are not as high as those made in 
the later period of public sector management.  It would appear therefore that it is 
ownership structure, towards a more market orientated organisation, rather than 
ownership form per se, that is the key component in productivity gains. 
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1. Introduction 
In the W hite Paper of July 1992 “New Opportunities for the Railways”, the then 
Conservative government stated it’s intention to “see better use made of the railways, 
greater responsiveness to the customer, and a higher quality of service and better 
value for money for the public who travel by rail” (DoT, 1992, p1).  It was argued that 
these benefits to the rail system would arise from the introduction of private sector 
management and through liberalisation of the market.  The overall rationale was that 
the introduction of competition into the rail system and the provision of appropriate 
incentives to all parties would provide greater economic efficiency (Foster 1994).  
This paper examines this issue in the form of productivity changes that have occurred 
in the passenger sector of the industry since privatisation. 
2. Background 
The long held view concerning the economics of railway operation is that both 
infrastructure and services are indivisible components that constitute a natural 
monopoly, and hence returns to scale are significant and inexhaustible given the 
market size.  An alternative view is that returns to scale and natural monopoly effects 
are solely associated with the infrastructure and not in the operation of services 
(Bradshaw and Aveline, 1996), sometimes referred to as the revisionist view (Preston, 
1994).  Following this logic, any restructuring of the industry should not be based 
around the necessity to maintain the infrastructure and services under the control of a 
single organisation, as an equally efficient (and hence productive) system can be 
produced under a more fragmented framework.  The structure that subsequently 
emerged from privatisation of the British industry is unique and the most radical in 
W estern Europe and broadly embraces the revisionist view.  The actual framework is 
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well documented elsewhere (see for example Curwen, 1997 and  Nash, 1993), hence 
to briefly summarise, the industry consists of a matrix of contracts between a large 
number of different companies, but a single supplier of infrastructure, Railtrack.  
Passenger services are divided into 25 time let individual units or franchises, 24 of 
which currently receive subsidy, and freight services are now split into two different 
companies by commodity.  On privatisation, rolling stock was apportioned between 
three rolling stock leasing companies (ROSCOs), infrastructure maintenance into 14 
units, and as stated above, the infrastructure was transferred into a single company 
that was subsequently floated on the stock exchange. 
The whole privatisation process netted some £5.2bn to the Treasury (Economist, 
1999), with Railtrack (£1.9bn) and the ROSCOs (£2.6bn) raising the vast bulk of this 
sum.  It also resulted in a considerable increase in the annual level of grant required to 
run passenger services, rising from a final year ‘old’ structure subsidy of £908m to a 
‘new’ structure level of £2,264m, an increase of almost 150%. 
3. The Role of Subsidy in Productivity Improvements 
Subsidy has a vital role to play under the privatised structure.  Firstly, as in the past, it 
is used to preserve socially desirable services that otherwise would not be profitable 
in the open market.  This is consistent with the notion of a public service obligation 
under the old nationalised framework.  Secondly, through negotiating year-on-year 
reductions in the levels of subsidy over the lifetime of the current franchises, train 
operating companies (TOCs) are actively encouraged to (a) increase revenue to make 
up for the lose in subsidy received and/or (b) reduce costs, again to make up for the 
subsidy decline.  Thirdly, although the passenger franchise system can be argued to be 
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consist with the theory of contestability (Baumol, 1982), a further motivation behind 
the division of the industry was to open up the possibility of competing passenger and 
freight services on significant sections of the network (Glaister 1995).  This it was 
argued would further enhance efficiency gains, lower prices and service 
improvements through competitive on line pressures.  Jones (2000) however has 
noted a distinct shift in policy away from this promotion of on line competition 
towards ensuring that subsidy reductions are maximised.  This shift has also been 
reinforced by the (Shadow) Strategic Rail Authority's (SRA) recently stated policy of 
only considering on-line competition in the forthcoming re-franchising process where 
passenger and tax payers interests are protected (SRA, 2000).  It may be implied 
therefore that the SRA seek to minimise public funds spent on the rail system, albeit 
at the possible expense of productivity improvements that may have arisen out of the 
pressure of direct competition. 
Table 1 reports a number of figures relating to subsidy.  Firstly, the agreed opening 
franchise payments, the payments in year 7 of the franchise (which is the lifetime of 
14 of the 25 franchises), the difference between the two and the length of the 
franchise let.  Secondly, the revenue and costs in year 1, i.e. 96/97, of the new 
structure.  The last two columns report the net percentage gain in passenger revenue 
and the percentage decrease in costs required to make up the reduction in annual 
subsidy over the first seven years.  All financial figures are expressed in 1997 pounds 
and train operating companies are divided between the former passenger business 
sectors of the nationalised British Rail. 
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Table 1: Subsidy Payment, Costs and Revenue, British Passenger Railway 
Franchise  Subsidy Financial Figures 
Year 96/97 
Cumulative % of 
  96/97 03/04 Diff Time Costs Rev Revenue Costs 
  £m £m £m Yrs £m £m   
Former Intercity    
Anglia Railways 41.0 6.3 34.7 7 82.6 41.4 9.1% 7.5%
Cross Country Trains 130.0 40.5 89.5 7 246.1 120.7 8.2% 6.3%
First Great Western 61.9 35.4 26.5 10 294.7 181.7 2.0% 1.3%
Gatwick Express -4.1 -13.3 9.2 15 27.1 28.4 4.1% 5.7%
Great North Eastern 67.3 0.0 67.3 7 282.6 194.7 4.3% 3.8%
Midland Main Line 17.6 -6.3 23.9 10 87.6 52.0 5.6% 4.4%
West Coast Trains 94.4 -52.7 147.1 15 369.8 250.8 6.8% 7.0%
All Former Intercity 408.1 9.9 398.2 1390.5 869.7 5.5% 4.7%
Former Network South East
Chiltern Railways 17.4 0.4 17.0 7 46.9 28.9 6.8% 6.2%
Connex South Central 92.8 5.3 87.5 7 223.2 132.8 7.5% 6.9%
Connex South Eastern 136.1 27.6 108.5 15 291.3 186.5 6.8% 6.4%
First Great Eastern 41.3 -9.5 50.8 7 164.4 130.3 4.8% 5.1%
Island Line1  2.3 1.0 1.3 5 3.1 0.8 21.5% 10.4%
LTS Rail  31.1 18.2 12.9 15 83.7 54.9 3.1% 2.4%
Silverlink  55.0 16.9 38.1 7 112.8 56.2 7.7% 5.7%
South West Trains1 63.3 35.7 27.6 6 358.3 221.2 2.0% 1.3%
Thames Trains 43.7 0.0 43.7 7½ 129.4 131.6 4.2% 5.7%
Thameslink 18.5 -28.4 46.9 7 127.3 127.0 4.6% 6.4%
West Anglia Grt. Nrtn. 72.6 -25.5 98.1 7 193.3 129.2 8.4% 9.6%
    
All Former NSE 574.1 41.7 532.4 1733.7 1199.3 6.6% 5.6%
Former Regional Railways 
Cardiff Railway2 22.5 13.6 8.9 10½ 29.6 6.4 13.3% 5.0%
Central  204.4 132.6 71.8 7 246.1 71.5 10.4% 4.8%
MerseyRail 87.6 60.8 26.8 7 80.2 16.3 14.9% 5.6%
Northern Spirit  231.1 145.6 85.5 7 303.4 75.0 11.5% 4.6%
North West 192.9 125.5 67.4 10 230.5 47.3 13.5% 4.8%
ScotRail  297.1 202.5 94.6 7 370.7 109.9 9.3% 4.1%
Wales & West2 84.6 39.2 45.4 10½ 138.5 48.3 9.9% 5.5%
   
All Former Reg. Rails 1120.2 719.8 400.4 1399.0 374.7 10.9% 4.7%
   
All Railways 2102.4 771.4 1331.0 4523.2 2443.8 6.4% 4.9%
   
Notes 1.  Note that for Island Line and South West Trains the 'closing subsidy' under the 
column headed '03/04' actually refers to financial years 01/02 and 02/03 respectively, 
hence the cumulative reductions are calculated on 5 and 6 years respectively. 
 2. These franchises were extended by a maximum of 3 years and one month before they 
will be incorporated into the new Wales and Borders franchise (SRA, 2001). 
Sources: Compiled from OPRAF (1997) and TAS (2000). 
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The cumulative percentage of revenue is the year-on-year increase in revenue 
required to offset the reduction in subsidy.  This is lower than the simple average 
percentage increase.  As an example, Chiltern Railways would require an 8.4% 
increase in revenue calculated on a simple basis (as shown in Cheek, 1997), compared 
to a 6.8% year-on-year cumulative increase. 
Table 1 shows that annual improvements in revenue required to meet subsidy 
reductions produce an overall average of 6.4% p.a. to the financial year 03/04, with 
the former Regional Railways as a group required to make a particularly severe 10.9% 
average annual improvement.  Given the industry is regulated on an RPI-1% basis, 
such increases in the main will have to come through increasing passenger numbers, 
and have been describe by Nash (1997) as ambitious. 
These figures however ignore the extent that revenues cover costs (cost recovery 
ratios - CRR) in different parts of the network.  As an example, for the financial year 
1995/96, these were 0.63, 0.69 and 0.27 for the former Intercity, Network South East 
and Regional Railways groups respectively.  Using Northern Spirit's 0.247 CRR as an 
example, the 11.5% annual improvement of revenue required to offset the decline in 
subsidy could equally be achieved through a 4.6% year-on-year decrease in costs or 
increases in productivity.  This relatively higher figure in relation to revenue than the 
CRR would suggest is because such gains must be achieved on a decreasing base 
every year, revenue gains on the other hand are calculated on an increasing base. 
Performance in relation to subsidy reductions however cannot be simply assessed by 
isolating increases in revenue, productivity gains and reductions in costs and 
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offsetting these against decreases in subsidy, as in order to increase revenue a TOC 
may have to increase costs.  Nevertheless, if unit costs and passenger numbers were to 
remain unchanged, subsidy reductions would require TOCs to achieve increases in 
productivity of between 1.2% and 7.3%, with a network average of 4.9%, in each of 
the first seven years of the new structure.   
4. Productivity Assessment 
Productivity may be assessed using a number of alternative methods, either by simple 
univariate measures, such as labour productivity, or more complex multivariate 
measures that give an assessment of total factor productivity (TFP).  Problems with 
the first group are well-known and well documented, see for example Cowie and 
Riddington (1996), and clearly a measure that gives an assessment of overall 
productivity changes that include the majority of inputs is preferable.  The approach 
taken here is through calculation of a productivity index, and such methods have been 
commonly used in the assessment of railway productivity (see for example Trethaway 
et. al., 1997).  The figures shown in Table 2 relate to the average annual Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) changes between the financial years 1995/96 and 1998/99 i.e. 
across four financial years but three time periods.  It therefore includes an element of 
shadow running i.e. where franchises were operated by the residual parts of the 
publicly owned British Rail.  The actual indices were calculated using the Tornqvist 
or translog index formula (Hensher and Waters II 1993).  In simple terms, this 
weights changes in output by their relative importance to revenue and sets these 
against changes in inputs weighted by their relative share of total costs to give a 
measure of the change in productivity.  The formal index is shown below as equation 
1:
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where there are M outputs and N inputs, iR  indicates the mean passenger 
revenue share of output yi between years k and l, and jS  the mean cost share 
of input xj between years k and l.  
This was calculated using labour, traction rolling stock and size of network as the 
inputs, as examination of the annual accounts revealed that these three inputs 
accounted for around 85% of TOC's costs over the period reviewed.  Train kilometres 
were used as the only output, as the two major sources of income, passengers and the 
SRA, are both highly dependent on the production of train kilometres.  Furthermore, 
specification of such an output better reflects what TOC's attempt to achieve.  In an 
industry characterised by strict price regulation, public sector contracts and network 
congestion in many areas, TOCs are prevented from profit maximising through the 
production of technically efficient passenger kilometres, hence will attempt to sales 
maximise through the production of technically efficient train kilometres. 
The actual data on train kilometres and network size were taken from the OPRAF 
annual reports (see for example OPRAF, 1999).  Numbers employed and traction 
rolling stock figures were obtained from the relevant Railway Gazette Directories 
(e.g. Bushell, 1998) and confirmed by the Rail Industry Monitor (TAS, 2000).  
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Finally, all financial figures came from the individual Annual Reports.  The 
associated costs used for the three inputs were salaries and wages, ROSCO leasing 
charges and Railtrack access charges respectively. 
Before presenting the results, Tretheway et. al. (1997) make two important practical 
observations regarding such productivity measures.  Firstly, as output and input 
growth varies from year-to-year what is important is the overall trend over a number 
of years, as this best reflects TFP.  Secondly, strong TFP growth does not necessarily 
correlate with comparable financial performance; the former relates quantities of 
output to quantities of input, whilst the latter relates the value of output to the cost of 
input.  Most of the following analysis therefore concerns trends, either across the four 
years reviewed or over the twenty-five TOCs.  Some loose relationship between TFP 
performance and financial performance is however also identified. 
The results from TFP estimation are shown in Table 2.  This gives the figures over the 
periods 1996/97, 1997/98 and 1998/99, for each franchise again grouped under the 
previous British Rail sectors.  Shown in the final column of Table 2 are the average 
changes in total productivity for each franchise over the whole period, and as such are 
the average changes in each year.  The results are also given for the average for the 25 
franchises (simple), and the results for the total network, which was found by adding 
the outputs, inputs, revenues and costs for all 25 franchises. 
Page 11 
Table 2: Productivity Improvement, Passenger Rail Franchises, 1995/96 – 
1998/99 
Franchise 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 Period 
Former Intercity 
Anglia Railways 2.0% 1.6% 2.3% 2.0% 
Cross Country Trains -0.4% 1.3% 12.2% 4.2% 
First Great Western Railway 4.7% 7.0% 2.5% 4.7% 
Gatwick Express 5.1% 1.6% 5.3% 4.0% 
Great North Eastern Railway 3.0% 5.9% 3.1% 3.9% 
Midland Main Line 5.6% 5.2% 2.6% 4.4% 
West Coast Trains 2.1% 5.5% 5.1% 4.2% 
All Former Intercity 3.1% 4.0% 4.7% 3.9% 
Former Network South East 
Chiltern Railway Company 8.1% 15.7% 2.1% 8.6% 
Connex South Central 3.4% 9.1% 13.6% 8.6% 
Connex South Eastern 4.4% 5.2% 2.3% 4.0% 
First Great Eastern 0.9% 4.9% 9.0% 4.9% 
Island Line 0.7% 2.8% -0.5% 0.9% 
LTS Rail 3.5% 6.0% 3.2% 4.2% 
Silverlink Train Services -0.8% 5.2% 4.9% 3.1% 
South West Trains 7.6% 0.9% 0.9% 3.2% 
Thames Trains 5.8% 8.2% 1.2% 5.0% 
Thameslink 2.4% 4.3% 4.1% 3.6% 
West Anglia Great Northern -0.9% 0.2% 2.8% 0.7% 
All Former Network South East 3.2% 5.7% 4.0% 4.2% 
Former Regional Railways 
Cardiff Railway Company 2.3% 4.3% 3.6% 3.4% 
Central Trains 2.5% 5.2% 8.5% 5.4% 
First North Western Trains 2.2% 5.7% 14.9% 7.4% 
Merseyrail Electrics 4.2% 2.6% 4.7% 3.8% 
Northern Spirit 3.7% 7.4% 1.5% 4.1% 
ScotRail Railways 2.7% 7.1% 5.9% 5.2% 
Wales and West 2.4% 5.3% 2.4% 3.3% 
All Former Regional Railways 2.8% 5.4% 5.9% 4.2% 
Mean (Simple) 3.1% 5.1% 4.7% 4.3% 
Mean (Network) 3.2% 5.5% 5.2% 4.6% 
Over the time periods shown, all TOCs have seen improvements in total factor 
productivity, ranging from an annual average figure of 0.7% on the West Anglia 
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Great Northern to just under 9% on Connex South Central.  For the whole passenger 
network, total productivity has increased by an average of 4.4% per annum since 
1996.  Within the rail industry however, major developments have historically tended 
to occur over a relatively long period of time.  The productivity results shown in 
Table 2 on the other hand reflect short term gains, as despite the use of a multi-input 
index, in most cases these are as a result of adjustment of only one input, namely 
labour.  This has been reflected in significant reductions in staffing levels in TOCs 
since privatisation, with virtually all companies reducing staff in 1996, all except five 
in 1997 and finally only nine companies maintaining or increasing staff levels in 
1998.  Over the period reviewed, across all TOCs this has resulted in an average 
decrease in staff of around 4% per annum.  Early indications are however that this 
trend has been reducing, with staff levels only decreasing by 2% in the last year 
reviewed.  This also suggests that possibilities for continued improvements in total 
productivity using this measure are declining and hence TOCs may have to look at 
other measures if these trends are to continue in the medium to longer term. 
With regard to the rolling stock input, rolling stock levels have remained almost static 
over the period.  This has occurred despite strong commitments at the time of the 
franchise lets for investment in new rolling stock.  This rise in expected investment 
has been highlighted as one of the major advantages of privatisation of the railways 
(Cheek, 1997).  It was argued that having been freed from the financial constraints of 
the public sector, railway companies would be far more able to raise the required 
finance for such investment projects.  Under the new structure however, there have 
been substantial problems in introducing new rolling stock onto the network.  Indeed, 
over the whole period reviewed only 40 new traction rolling stock units were 
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introduced, as against the 100 odd new units planned under the franchise lets.  The 
limited sources of productivity gains therefore are not solely related to the relative 
shortness of the period reviewed, but also operational problems in the new industry 
structure.  It also highlights however that TFP improvements have been achieved 
despite ageing rolling stock, on what was already relatively old stock. 
Gains in productivity however can equally arise from production of more output 
utilising the same level of input.  TOCs have been fairly active in this respect, by 
increasing service frequencies to successfully generate increases in passenger 
numbers, hence producing more train kilometres.  Examining Table 2, the six 
companies that have achieved the highest gains in productivity are the same six 
companies that have expanded output by the most.  In other words, have implemented 
the largest increases in train kilometres and by implication have pursued the most 
'expansionist' policies.  This suggests that output increases are a key factor in 
productivity gains.  Interestingly, such actions are not consistent with the aim of 
reducing (total) costs, but perhaps are more reflective of a 're-investment' of 
productivity improvements.  In part this goes against one of the major pre-
privatisation fears that given such low CRRs, in many cases TOCs would concentrate 
more on cost reductions through providing minimal services rather than revenue 
increases to meet subsidy shortfalls. 
It should also be highlighted that TOCs are not entirely responsible for these 
productivity figures, as one of the inputs, infrastructure, is not directly under their 
control.  This input could, and perhaps should, be dropped from the analysis, but 
given that it is a major determinant of productivity and the largest single cost to TOCs 
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(45% in 1997), this makes little sense.  Clearly Railtrack has a central role to play and 
in particular its actions directly effect the productivity of TOCs.  Concerns were 
raised early on by the TOCs themselves (see for example Financial Times 10/12/98) 
regarding the position of Railtrack.  It was argued that as the infrastructure company 
was making large profits from routine track operation and track access charges there 
may be a temptation for it to avoid the financial risks involved in more innovative rail 
schemes that increase track capacity.  In order in part to alleviate such concerns, an 
investigation by the Office of the Rail Regulator set a ceiling on Railtrack's profits of 
between 5-6% on its assets (ORR, 1998).  This however was followed by a full-scale 
review of Railtrack's incentives framework (ORR, 2000).  In the current context, the 
new framework proposes two significant changes.  Firstly, to alter the criteria for 
payments made to Railtrack for improved operational performance - in other words, 
the punctuality of services.  Those that were in place were recognised to be 
ineffectual.  Clearly less network delays would increase TOC productivity.  Secondly, 
to empower TOCs to engage third party contractors to undertake network 
enhancements after Railtrack has rejected the opportunity to match any such bid.  This 
document therefore in part addresses the role of Railtrack in productivity 
improvements, but at the time of writing (June 2001) is still at the consultation stage 
and has only partially been implemented. 
Whether the productivity improvements shown in Table 2 are of a sufficiently large 
quantity to meet the financial requirements of the franchise agreements remains to be 
seen.  Purely on the cost reduction 'targets' shown in Table 1 however, in terms of 
productivity improvements nine TOCs exceed these and another four are within one 
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percent
1
.  This is also reflected in profitability, with figures from TAS (2000) 
suggesting that taken as a whole TOCs made a 3.7% operating profit on turnover in 
1997/98, an increase from 1.7% in 1996/1997.  Four companies recorded losses, these 
including three of the six poorest TFP performers.  Under the privatised regime 
therefore, improving productivity would appear to be one of the key determinants to 
profitability.   
5. Comparisons with the Nationalised British Rail 
For comparative purposes, Table 3 gives figures for the cumulative average annual 
growth in total factor productivity for the privatised rail network between financial 
years 1995/96 and 1998/99 shown along with the performance of the nationalised 
British Rail (BR) over a number of relevant time periods. 
Table 3: Average Annual Total Factor Productivity Changes, Privatised and 
Publicly Owned Rail Systems. 
 Total Factor 
Productivity 
Changes
Britain’s Passenger Rail (1995 – 1998) 4.4%
British Railways (1985 – 1990) 6.7%
British Railways (1980 – 1985) 0.9%
British Railways (1972 – 1980) -0.2%
Small, negative, factor productivity changes in BR during the 1970s reflect the 
perception of the railways at that time being in significant decline due to low levels of 
investment (Henshaw, 1994), general industrial unrest in Britain during that period 
                                                          
1 Interestingly, it is the former BR regional railways TOCs that perform best under this measure, with 
five of the seven being at least within 1% of their respective 'targets'. 
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and falling passenger numbers (see for example DoT 1980). Particularly strong 
improvements followed sectorisation however, i.e. the re-structuring of BR into 
business units, in the latter half of the 1980s; TFP grew typically by 6.7% p.a. during 
that period.  This is consistent with the findings of Nash and Preston (1992), who 
indicated that the scope for private sector improvements in productivity in BR (or any 
subsequent hybrid) would be limited due to strong performance in the public sector.  
Furthermore, these results suggest that productivity improvements may be better 
explained by organisational reform, re-orientating management away from operations 
towards the market, rather than the introduction of private sector management per se. 
It is arguable therefore that the productivity gains achieved since privatisation may 
well have been equally attainable in the public sector. 
6. Relationship of Subsidy to Productivity 
This section attempts to identify if a relationship exists between relative subsidy cuts 
and changes in productivity in the privatised passenger railway.  In order to test this 
simple hypothesis, productivity gains are regressed upon relative subsidy cuts and the 
relative change in passenger numbers, by using ordinary least squares to estimate the 
following equation: 
)Jln(b)Sln(ba)TFPln( i2i1i    [2] 
 Where:  
 TFP = average growth in total factor productivity for TOCi
 Si = reduction in subsidy as a percentage of revenue for TOCi
 Ji = average growth in passenger journeys for TOCi
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Average growth in passenger numbers is included as a control variable, as companies 
may increase revenue through carrying more passengers as an alternative/in addition 
to decreasing costs through TFP gains.  The preceding analysis would suggest that 
any such action would require better utilisation of inputs and therefore would increase 
productivity, hence a priori, a positive coefficient for b2 may be expected.  If there is a 
relationship between subsidy cuts and productivity gains, then a positive (significant) 
estimate would also be expected for b1 in equation 2.  The actual results from this 
regression are given below as equation 3 with t-values shown in parenthesis below: 
  Ln(TFPi) = -2.7947 - 0.03112 Ln(Si) + 0.1885 Ln(Ji)  [3] 
                 (-4.8241)     (-0.1784)      (2.5520) 
0546.0p,3291.3F,1625.0R,25n 2     
The regression suggests that, as expected, increases in productivity are positively 
related to increases in journeys, and the parameter estimate is found to be statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  The co-efficient for subsidy cuts however is not in the 
expected direction i.e. it suggests that smaller subsidy cuts lead to larger gains in 
productivity, but the actual parameter value is very small and not statistically 
significant.  Overall, the regression statistics are poor, with low R2 values and F 
statistics, indicating that there are other factors not included in the regression that 
would help 'explain' productivity improvements. 
Although this analysis may be limited and only included for discussion purposes, it 
does suggest that there is no relationship between cuts in subsidy and improvements 
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in productivity.  Taken to the extreme, cuts in subsidy do not provide a motive for 
increasing productivity, because if this was the case, then it would be expected that 
TOCs with the highest relative subsidy cuts would be the TOCs with the largest gains 
in productivity.  This analysis is however simplistic and it is difficult to believe that 
this is indeed the case.  Inevitably, basic economic logic would suggest that TOCs, 
particularly given the plc status of most of these firms, are driven by profit, which will 
be significantly effected by reductions in subsidy.  This must, at a general level, 
motivate cost reductions and productivity gains. 
Taken together with the previous analysis, it would appear that in the short term at 
least, TOCs do not require to meet the subsidy reduction 'targets' shown in Table 1 in 
order to maintain profitability.  This would also explain why no relationship could be 
found between subsidy cuts and productivity gains at the specific level.  The longer 
term however, particularly with the cumulative impact of subsidy reduction, may well 
produce a different result. 
7. Conclusions 
Four broad conclusions can be drawn from the preceding analysis. Firstly, these initial 
results suggest that TOCs over the period reviewed have been successful in increasing 
productivity, hence as a group have maintained profitability.  Companies have earned 
profitable, but not excessive, returns from passenger rail operations.  There has been 
however a strong suggestion of a subsequent shift in policy towards primarily 
promoting subsidy reduction after the franchises were let, and hence also protecting 
TOCs from direct on-line competition.  Furthermore, whether these positive 
productivity trends can be continued (as they need to be) for the remainder of the 
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franchise lets is questionable, given that most have been achieved through short run 
measures. 
Secondly, Railtrack has a large potential impact on TFP improvement on the 
passenger railway, however it is 'protected' from the primary market by TOCs.  In 
other words, it has little 'demand' risk.  This has long been recognised by the industry 
as a major weakness in the privatised industry structure, but initial actions by the Rail 
Regulator to rectify this position have proven ineffectual.  The new financial incentive 
framework has only recently been put out to consultation, and due to being overtaken 
by other events, the very latest being the collapse of Railtrack's share price, large 
sections await implementation.  If implemented as proposed, it should increase TOC 
productivity through operational improvements and give TOCs greater power with 
respect to line enhancements.  However, the whole future of Railtrack at this point in 
time is uncertain. 
Thirdly, comparisons with the nationalised British Rail strongly indicate that TFP 
gains have not significantly improved since privatisation, indeed performance has not 
been as strong as in the later years of nationalisation.  It appears that the re-focusing 
of BR in the mid to late 1980s towards a more market orientated structure achieved 
gains in productivity better than that achieved by the (passenger) industry since 
formal privatisation.  Alternatively, it may suggest that at the time of privatisation 
most of the immediate productivity gains in BR had already been achieved in the 
public sector.  Gains since that time may simply be a continuation of this trend (albeit 
at a lower level).  The actual change of ownership in the short term therefore does not 
appear to have improved productivity performance.  In the longer term however, 
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productivity improvements should arise far less from labour reductions and more 
from increased investment in both infrastructure and rolling stock.  Both however are 
dependent upon satisfactorily resolution of the problems currently facing the industry, 
particularly Railtrack's position. 
Finally, to date under the privatised regime subsidy cuts do not appear to have had a 
significant impact upon TOC productivity performance i.e. at the specific TOC level, 
no relationship could be found between relative subsidy reductions and productivity 
improvements.  This should not be taken as a general rule that these reductions have 
not impacted upon productivity change, but rather it may indicate that in the short 
term TOCs have concentrated upon other means to recoup these financial losses. 
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